Behind the "Koi Sharam Hoti Hai" Taunt Lies Pakistan’s Real Civil-Military Power Struggle

Behind the "Koi Sharam Hoti Hai" Taunt Lies Pakistan’s Real Civil-Military Power Struggle

When an opposition lawmaker in Pakistan’s National Assembly threw the viral Urdu taunt "Koi sharam hoti hai, koi haya hoti hai" at Defense Minister Khawaja Asif following Army Chief General Asim Munir’s diplomatic outreach to Iran, the chamber erupted into familiar theater. Social media clipped the soundbite within minutes. Television anchors replayed the jab on loop. Yet reducing this parliamentary clash to a mere viral insult misses the structural reality of governance in Islamabad: the civilian leadership is routinely left defending or absorbing the political fallout of foreign policy decisions engineered entirely by the military establishment in Rawalpindi.

To understand why a routine diplomatic trip by Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff triggered such visceral mockery toward the Defense Minister, one has to look past the theatrics of the National Assembly floor and examine the institutional mechanics of Pakistani statecraft.

The Anatomy of a Parliamentary Taunt

The phrase "Koi sharam hoti hai, koi haya hoti hai"—roughly translating to "Have some shame, have some modesty"—carries a specific cultural weight in Pakistani political discourse. Originally popularized by Khawaja Asif himself years ago during fiery speeches against his political rivals, the line has long since mutated into a bipartisan weapon used to highlight perceived hypocrisy.

When opposition benches, largely aligned with the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), directed those exact words back at Asif in the wake of General Munir’s visit to Tehran, the critique was twofold. First, they were accusing the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) coalition of abandoning its past rhetoric regarding civilian supremacy. Second, and far more pointedly, they were highlighting the institutional irrelevance of the Defense Ministry itself.

In most parliamentary democracies, a Defense Minister sets strategic policy, oversees military deployments, and leads high-level security diplomacy abroad, with the uniformed military leadership acting as advisors and executors. In Pakistan, that hierarchy operates in reverse. When General Asim Munir travels to Tehran to meet Iranian military commanders and political leadership to stabilize a volatile border, he is not merely representing the armed forces. He is acting as the primary architect of Pakistan's regional security posture.

Khawaja Asif, despite holding the constitutional portfolio for defense, sits on the periphery of these negotiations. Yet when parliament convenes, it is Asif who must stand at the podium, field questions from hostile lawmakers, and project an image of unified state authority. Opposition members know this. Their mockery is designed to expose the widening gap between constitutional title and actual executive power.

Why Tehran Required a General Instead of a Minister

The context of General Munir’s visit to Iran makes the civil-military divide even more pronounced. Relations between Islamabad and Tehran have long been a delicate balancing act, strained by cross-border militancy in the Balochistan and Sistan-Baluchestan regions, competing regional alliances, and economic sanctions.

Tensions reached a historic boiling point in January 2024, when both nations traded unprecedented cross-border airstrikes targeting alleged militant sanctuaries. While diplomats scrambled to de-escalate the crisis and restore ambassadorial ties, the underlying security friction never truly vanished. Smuggling networks, separatist insurgencies, and mutual suspicions over intelligence sharing continued to simmer along the 900-kilometer border.

Resolving security deadlocks of that magnitude in South Asia rarely happens through civilian ministries. From Tehran's perspective, dealing with Pakistan's civilian cabinet offers limited guarantees when the levers of border security, intelligence operations, and counter-insurgency reside firmly within General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi. Iranian officials, pragmatic in their own dual-track system where the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) wields immense influence alongside the Foreign Ministry, understand exactly where real decision-making authority sits in Islamabad.

Consequently, when General Munir engages with Iranian counterparts, the discussions focus on tangible security mechanisms—joint border fencing, intelligence-sharing protocols, and coordinated operations against non-state actors. These are operational commitments that only the Pakistani military can authorize and enforce.

For the civilian government, this creates an awkward political reality. The Prime Minister’s Office and the Foreign Office issue carefully worded press releases welcoming improved bilateral ties, while the Defense Minister is left to defend the optics of a system where uniformed officers conduct foreign policy directly.

Khawaja Asif’s Complicated Political Evolution

The opposition’s jab lands harder because of Khawaja Asif’s specific political history. For decades, Asif was among the sharpest critics of military overreach in Pakistani politics. During periods when the PML-N was in opposition or locked in confrontation with the security establishment, Asif routinely delivered blistering speeches on the floor of the National Assembly, demanding accountability for intelligence agencies and asserting the primacy of the elected parliament.

Politics in Islamabad, however, runs on shifting alliances rather than fixed ideological lines.

Since the ouster of former Prime Minister Imran Khan in 2022 and the subsequent formation of the PML-N-led coalition governments, Asif’s public posture has undergone a visible transformation. As Defense Minister, he has frequently defended the military establishment against criticism from the PTI, arguing that state institutions must work in harmony to pull Pakistan out of its severe economic and security crises.

To his supporters, this shift represents political pragmatism—an acknowledgment that open warfare between the civilian government and the military destroys economic stability and invites institutional collapse. To his detractors, it looks like opportunism. When PTI lawmakers shout "Koi sharam hoti hai" across the aisle, they are reminding Asif of his own past speeches, effectively using his older political persona to indict his current role.

The Structural Trap of Hybrid Governance

What unfolded in the National Assembly is not unique to Khawaja Asif or General Asim Munir. It is a recurring symptom of what political analysts in South Asia describe as Pakistan's hybrid governance model.

Under this arrangement, civilian politicians win elections, manage day-to-day administrative headaches, negotiate unpopular austerity measures with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and absorb public anger over inflation and taxation. Meanwhile, the military retains decisive influence over national security, foreign policy toward key neighbors like India, Afghanistan, and Iran, and strategic ties with superpowers such as the United States and China.

This division of labor creates a permanent accountability deficit:

  • Authority without legislative scrutiny: When military leaders conduct high-stakes diplomacy abroad, they do not appear before parliamentary committees to face cross-examination from elected representatives.
  • Responsibility without control: Civilian ministers must answer to parliament and the public for the broader trajectory of the country, even when major strategic decisions are made outside their offices.
  • Weaponized parliamentary debate: Because opposition parties cannot directly summon military chiefs to the floor of the house to debate policy, they direct their frustration at the closest civilian proxy—usually the Defense Minister or the Law Minister.

The result is a degradation of parliamentary discourse. Substantive debates over border trade with Iran, the stalled Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project, or counter-terrorism strategies in Balochistan get drowned out by personal insults and viral soundbites.

The Overlooked Economic Stakes in Iran

While television cameras focused on the shouting match in Islamabad, the actual substance of Pakistan-Iran diplomacy received far less scrutiny. Beyond counter-terrorism, the economic stakes between the two neighbors are immense, yet paralyzed by geopolitical constraints.

Pakistan faces a chronic energy deficit, with soaring electricity and gas prices crippling industrial output and sparking nationwide protests. Iran possesses vast natural gas reserves right next door. For over a decade, the multi-billion-dollar Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline has been touted as a lifeline for Pakistan's energy-starved economy. Iran has already constructed its section of the pipeline up to the Pakistani border, while Islamabad has repeatedly delayed its portion due to the threat of secondary sanctions from the United States.

At the same time, informal border trade between Balochistan and southeastern Iran sustains hundreds of thousands of livelihoods in regions starved of federal investment. When security incidents flare up and border crossings shut down, local economies collapse almost overnight, fueling the very alienation that separatist militants exploit.

Addressing these interlocking challenges requires seamless coordination between military planners, foreign diplomats, energy ministries, and finance officials. Yet in Islamabad, institutional silos remain rigid. The military handles the border security file; the Foreign Office manages the diplomatic messaging around U.S. sanctions; and the civilian cabinet deals with the domestic political backlash.

Why Opposition Mockery Rarely Changes the Equation

There is an unmistakable irony in the opposition’s attack on Khawaja Asif. During the PTI’s tenure in power from 2018 to 2022, Imran Khan’s cabinet operated under the exact same hybrid framework. At the time, PTI ministers fiercely defended the military leadership against PML-N criticism, praising "one-page" civil-military alignment as essential for national progress.

When PTI’s relationship with the military establishment fractured in 2021 and 2022, the party suddenly rediscovered the language of civilian supremacy, constitutionalism, and parliamentary sovereignty—while the PML-N stepped into the role of defending institutional harmony.

This cyclical role-reversal explains why parliamentary taunts like "Koi sharam hoti hai" generate endless headlines without producing structural reform. Both major political camps have, at different moments, relied on the military establishment to outmaneuver their rivals, only to cry foul when the political winds shift.

As long as Pakistan’s major political parties treat civil-military imbalance as a tactical talking point in opposition rather than an institutional problem to be solved through bipartisan consensus, scenes like the one in the National Assembly will repeat indefinitely. The names at the podium will change, and the viral catchphrases will rotate, while the real center of strategic gravity remains firmly anchored across the river in Rawalpindi.

YS

Yuki Scott

Yuki Scott is passionate about using journalism as a tool for positive change, focusing on stories that matter to communities and society.